Decentralised Finance: the defenestration of retail investor protections or a brave new world? | ESCP Business School

Thesis Defence
Decentralised Finance: the defenestration of retail investor protections or a brave new world?

Mark Le Page

Mark Le Page will publicly defend his thesis.

November 5, 2026
4PM CET
Amphitheater 1030

Attend the defence

Abstract

Prior to 7 May 2022, stablecoins had grown annually by 500 per cent. This was reflective of a wider interest in decentralised finance (DeFi) and, by corollary, regulatory concerns about retail access. A regression using the Prais-Winston, Cochrane-Orcutt methodology found that, of the differing stablecoin methodologies, the most likely to survive a specific attack was the algorithmic partial collateral method. It is noteworthy that algorithmic partial collateral methodologies approximate to fractional reserve banking.

Part II considers whether there were other methodologies similar to traditional finance (TradFi). DeFi and TradFi practices appear to be converging. The Paper also suggests that DeFi contains both similar and new challenges for retail investors to navigate. The Chapter suggests that some problems in TradFi, for example whether a market is efficient or not, may be exacerbated in DeFi. Additionally, there are governance challenges, through the absence of the equivalent of corporate law and therefore lack of clarity as to who holds fiduciary responsibilities.

Chapter III concludes the dialectic. Are regulators obliged to restrict access to vulnerable investors? Why should retail investors be denied returns? It focuses on one form of asset management, investment gardens.

Eight Gardens are regressed against the S&P 500, Bitcoin and Ethereum prices. Granger Causality Analysis seeks to establish whether there is rationality in the DeFi markets. Gardens’ Sharpe Ratios are compared to sixty traditional investment funds.

Chapter III casts doubt on the hypothesis that investment gardens present financial harm to the public. It proposes an extension of adverse selection within agency theory. The propensity for retail investors to understand a garden, utilising any sources, should be a determinant whether retail investors are allowed to invest.

Keywords: DeFi; game theory; governance; fiduciary duties; efficient markets; investment bubbles; adverse selection

Jury

Thesis Director:

  • Prof. Pablo Winant
    Associate Professor of Economics, ESCP Business School

Referees & Suffragants:

  • Prof. Julien Fouquau
    Full Professor of Finance, ESCP Business School
  • Prof. Nathalie Janson
    Associate Professor of Economics, Neoma Business School

Location

Organiser: ESCP Business School

Amphitheater 1030 - France

Map

Date

Start date: 05/11/2026

Start time: 4:00 PM