We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we'll assume that you are happy to receive all cookies on the ESCP website. However, if you would like to, you can change your cookie settings at any time.

Close

Thesis Defense
"Bank-firm relationships, competition and asymmetric information"

Nicolas Taillet, PhD candidate in the PhD programme ESCP

Nicolas Taillet, PhD candidate in the PhD programme ESCP, publicly defended his PhD thesis in Management Sciences.

20 September 2022
ESCP Business School Campus République

Abstract

The thesis builds on a large body of work analyzing the implications of asymmetric information on bank-firm relationships. It considers the issue from three different perspectives: asymmetric information of firms about banks, asymmetric information between banks about firms, asymmetric information of banks about other banks.

In the first article, we show, using a theoretical model, that information generated by banks can lead to credit rationing if borrowers have imperfect information about their lender’s type. Indeed, to be recognized by firms as information generating banks, the banks need to display low portfolio default rate, which can only happen if they exclude risky borrowers.

In the second article, we change perspective and analyze asymmetric information banks generate about firms as well as across banks. We investigate how banks use the information they generate during a lending relationship. We show theoretically that informed banks can unload part of their exposure to uninformed banks when anticipating a borrower's default. We confirm this effect empirically and note that this effect is prevalent for firms, for which the public information has not yet deteriorated, i.e. for which the difference between private and public information is the largest.

Finally, in the third article, we empirically show that, in regions where bank competition is lower, firms require more banks to join their bank pool in order to create additional competition. This suggests that firms can strategically generate bank competition in order to reduce banks' bargaining power.

Jury

Supervisor:

  • Mr Michael Troege,
    Professor, ESCP Business School

Referees:

  • Mr Jean-Christophe Statnik,
    Professor, Université de Lille
  • Mr Christophe Godlewski,
    Professor, EM Strasbourg

Suffragants:

  • Mr Thomas David,
    Professor, ESCP Business School

Campuses