Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has deeply reshaped the European Union’s relations with Eastern European countries, drawing new dynamics of exclusion - vis-à-vis Russia and Belarus - and inclusion -with other countries in the region. The opening of an EU accession perspective for the three associated countries– Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – is a major turning point, which marks a clear break with the lack of a clear endgoal as part of the European neighbourhood policy.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the reelection of Donald Trump as US President have given a boost to the perspectives of a European defence. Not later than 2016 did the European Council claim that Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security. Europe has increased massively its defence spending, it develops common financing tools, it has helped militarily Ukraine, it considers bringing security guarantees to Ukraine after a possible ceasefire, and a debate on a possible European nuclear deterrence has taken shape.

Much has been said and written about the 18 sanction packages mulled by the European Union to counter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, assessments are often contradictory : some analysts consider that they have been without any significant effect, provoking on the contrary two unintended outcomes : pushing Russia into China’s arms and accelerating the building of import substituting industries. For others, despite Russia’s ability, with the help of its strategic partners, to circumvent partially some of the sanctions, they have been able to weaken constantly the very foundations of Russia’s capacity to maintain or upgrade its conventional military capacities in the long run,